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Abstract 
In this article, we develop indicators of vulnerability in employment in seven economic capitals of West 
Africa and study their links with individual incomes from the main job. We draw on data from the 1-2-3 
Surveys in 2002-2003 to make a cross-country comparison using rigorously the same variables and 
methodology for each country. The theory of compensating differentials states that workers may receive 
pecuniary compensation commensurate with the strenuous or hazardous nature of their tasks or adverse 
working conditions. Our interpretation of the link between employment status and incomes draws on these 
developments, applying them to both working conditions themselves and more broadly to vulnerability in 
employment. The main tested assumption is that high levels of employment vulnerability could be 
compensated by greater earnings. We allow for individual and job characteristics (the latter being used to 
construct the composite index of vulnerability) to be differentially valued for conditionally high and low 
income earners. Our composite index of employment vulnerability indicates that 85% of the private sector 
workers in all the economic capitals studied are vulnerable on the basis of at least one criterion. The results 
show that the average impact of vulnerability on earnings is generally negative for an average level of 
vulnerability. In the formal private sector of the West African cities, losses of income due to vulnerability 
are lower for high levels of vulnerability, but do not translate into gains. In the informal sector, however, 
the average predicted income for a high vulnerability level is higher than the average predicted income for 
a low vulnerability level. Quantitative, distributional and qualitative analyses show that vulnerability 
compensating mechanism is mainly seen in the informal sector, in the upper tail of the earnings 
distribution, and particularly in the circumstance of visible underemployment. Employment vulnerability is 
not compensated for the poorest workers in the private sector of these large west-African cities.  
Key words : Vulnerability, working conditions, compensating differentials, earnings, informal sector, West 
Africa. 
Résumé 
Dans cet article, nous construisons des indicateurs de la vulnérabilité au travail dans sept capitales économiques 
d’Afrique de l’Ouest et étudions leurs liens avec les revenus individuels de l’activité principale. Selon la théorie 
des salaires compensatoires, les travailleurs pourraient recevoir des compensations pécuniaires à hauteur de la 
pénibilité de leur tâche ou de leurs conditions de travail. Notre interprétation du lien entre le statut dans l’emploi 
et le revenu s’inspire de ces développements, en les appliquant non seulement aux conditions de travail 
proprement dites, mais plus largement à la vulnérabilité dans l’emploi (précarité contractuelle, conditions 
d’exercice, sous-emploi, emploi de secours inadapté aux caractéristiques individuelles). Notre indicateur 
composite de la vulnérabilité dans l’emploi révèle que 85% des travailleurs des secteurs privés de l'ensemble des 
capitales économiques étudiées sont vulnérables selon au moins un de nos critères de vulnérabilité (sur huit 
critères). L'effet moyen de la vulnérabilité sur les gains est généralement négatif pour un niveau moyen de 
vulnérabilité. Dans le secteur privé formel, les pertes de revenu causées par la vulnérabilité diminuent pour des 
hauts niveaux de vulnérabilité, mais ne se transforment pas en gains. Dans le secteur informel en revanche, le 
revenu prédit moyen pour une vulnérabilité élevée est supérieur à ce revenu pour une vulnérabilité faible. 
Finalement, nos analyses, qui sont tour à tour quantitative, distributive et « qualitative », montrent que des 
mécanismes compensatoires de la vulnérabilité dans l’emploi n’existeraient que dans le secteur informel, pour 
les travailleurs de la partie haute de la distribution des revenus, et en particulier dans le cas du sous-emploi 
visible. La vulnérabilité dans l’emploi n’est donc pas compensée pour les travailleurs les plus pauvres du secteur 
privé de ces grandes villes ouest-africaines. 
Mots clés : Vulnérabilité, conditions de travail, différentiels compensatoires, revenus, secteur informel, 
Afrique de l’Ouest. 
JEL Classification : J24, J31, O12 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
Urban labor market workers in sub-Saharan Africa work in often highly insecure 
conditions. The World Bank’s 2000 report states that job insecurity is a major concern among 
poor workers and job instability is a leading cause and expression of poverty. One of the main 
focuses of studies on labor markets in sub-Saharan Africa is the institutional segmentation 
between formal and informal sectors (Maloney, 2004). Informal work is defined from the point 
of view of the firm, worker or line of business depending on the policy aims. The 1993 System of 
National Accounts (SNA93) – comprising a set of international standards designed to establish a 
framework for the production of statistics on national accounts – defines a distinction at firm 
level based on statistical or tax registration criteria and keeping written accounts. 
Yet this distinction serves no purpose when it comes to capturing individuals’ working 
conditions, especially employment vulnerability. By vulnerability, we mean how hard it is for 
individuals to manage the risks or cope with the losses and costs associated with the occurrence 
of risky events or situations.1 For example, the vulnerability of workers can be seen, among other 
things, in terms of contract insecurity (unstable remuneration and no written contract), or 
adverse working conditions. Vulnerable workers can be found in all sorts of formal and informal 
private firms, but also in administrations and public and semi-public corporations. A good many 
vulnerable workers work in the formal private sector, as per the SNA93 definition of the term. 
This paper focuses solely on the private sector (formal and informal businesses), based on the 
assumption that vulnerability is driven by different mechanisms in the public and private sectors. 
                                                 
1 The still-developing economic literature on vulnerability includes a range of definitions of this notion. Wilson and 
Ramphele (1989) define it as the risk of destitution, famine or death. The concept of vulnerability moved forwards 
recently with Amartya Sen’s capability approach (1992 and 1999). Cheli and Lemmi (1995) consequently propose a 
fuzzy and relative approach to vulnerability, which enables them to define an “exposure to the risk of poverty” 
notion. The vulnerability concept used in Qizilbash (2003 and 2006) is an individual’s distance from a definite, 
unambiguous state of poverty. The closer individuals are to being definitely poor, the greater their vulnerability. In 
Dubois and Rousseau (2001), vulnerability is a person’s own structure of “capabilities” that enables that person to 
replace (or not) one capability with another in the event of an exogenous shock. The loss of a job would therefore 
have a greater impact on an individual with less leeway to work in different occupations and a low level of economic 
and social capital. We refer in this article to a notion similar to that developed by Cheli and Lemmi (1995) and 
Qizilbash (2006), privileging the relative and multidimensional aspect of poverty.  
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We build employment vulnerability indicators and study their links with earned income. 
The theory of compensating differentials formalized in the 1980s2 states that workers may 
receive pecuniary compensation commensurate with the strenuous or hazardous nature of their 
tasks or adverse working conditions. In the developed countries, for example, it has been 
observed that physically hazardous and highly strenuous jobs are often better paid than less 
strenuous or hazardous jobs.3 Our interpretation of the link between vulnerability and income 
draws then on developments in the theory of compensating differentials. While the overall 
purpose of this paper is not to test the predictions of this theory in all its components, a working 
assumption we still investigate is whether, other things being equal, workers classified as 
vulnerable may be better paid than more stable workers occupying less strenuous jobs. Should 
this be the case, an incentive should be found for certain individuals to hold a vulnerable job, 
especially if the medium- or long-run advantage associated with stable jobs is not valued by 
households forced into short-term income management. These households should prefer higher, 
immediate earnings – even from a vulnerable job – to stable earnings over a longer period. A 
high earnings incentive for vulnerable jobs would increase the risk to fall into poverty.  In this 
paper, we do not deal with adverse working conditions stricto sensu, such as job health hazards, 
but use a broader concept of vulnerability in employment. This concept does not necessarily 
entail compensating mechanisms as predicted by the theory of compensating differentials. Our 
results cannot therefore be used to validate the applicability of the theoretical predictions across 
developed and developing countries. The motivation for this study is rather to determine 
whether possible compensating differentials can explain the acceptance of generally bad working 
conditions as observed in these cities or not. 
The questions of vulnerability determinants and the link between vulnerability and 
remuneration raise a certain number of methodological problems that this paper endeavors to 
                                                 
2 See Brown (1980), Rosen (1986), and Murphy and Topel (1987). 
3 However, there is not a great deal of empirical evidence to support this point. See, in particular, Poggi (2007) and 
Fernández and Nordman (2009). 
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solve. First of all, there is the existence of labor market entry selection and endogenous sector 
allocation across the public, formal private or informal private sectors. Observable individual 
characteristics (such as human capital in general), but also unobservable individual characteristics, 
influence both the decision to participate to a labor market segment and the level of individual 
earnings in Africa4. Not taking this into account may lead to biased estimates of the determinants 
of individual earnings. Secondly, there is a likelihood of vulnerability being endogenous in the 
earnings equations. Vulnerability would be endogenous if the individuals’ unobservable 
characteristics are correlated with both their level of vulnerability and their level of earnings. 
Selection and endogeneity, if not taken into account, can produce biases in the estimation of the 
relationship between vulnerability and earnings. For instance, an overestimation of the positive 
impact of vulnerability on individual earnings may appear if unobservable characteristics, such as 
worker perseverance, are positively correlated with the probability of taking up a vulnerable job 
while simultaneously being positively correlated with earnings.5  
Our analysis also takes a distributional approach. Another working assumption is that 
vulnerability can have a different effect on income depending on the worker’s relative position 
on the remuneration scale. Hence, for equal observable characteristics, workers at the lower tail 
of the earnings distribution (poor) could be penalized in monetary terms by their vulnerability 
whereas workers at the top of the distribution (wealthy) might not be penalized and may well 
receive pecuniary compensation in vulnerable jobs. These different pay mechanisms depending 
on remuneration scale position could be due to bargaining power differences and labor market 
imbalances. In the first case, greater bargaining power for the wealthy would enable workers at 
the upper tail of the earnings distribution to secure higher compensation for the vulnerability of 
their jobs. Conversely, workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution might be more forceful 
                                                 
4 See Dimova, Nordman and Roubaud (2010). 
5 Alternatively, unaccounted low worker motivation may produce an underestimation of any compensating 
mechanism on earnings if these characteristics are positively correlated with the probability of bearing a job with 
adverse working conditions. 
6 
in negotiations for premium pay if they are seeking to secure a living wage. Compensation for 
vulnerability would therefore decrease the further the worker moved from a minimum 
subsistence income. In the case of labor market imbalances, the employer’s capacity to provide 
financial compensation for adverse working conditions might also differ depending on the type 
of imbalances found in certain market segments, in particular along the length of the skills and 
hence earnings distribution. For example, it would make sense to find that employers in 
segments where labor supply far outstrips demand are reluctant to pay workers more for adverse 
working conditions. These hypotheses, which assume that the effect of vulnerability on earnings 
differs depending on the position in the earnings distribution, are tested using quantile 
regressions. 
Lastly, our analysis takes a ‘qualitative’ approach, conducting a principal component factor 
analysis on the different aspects of the vulnerability phenomenon. The main components 
obtained, which represent the different qualitative facets of vulnerability (contractual insecurity, 
working conditions, underemployment and stopgap jobs mismatched with the individual’s 
characteristics), are then used as vulnerability variables. 
This paper gives empirical results on seven West African capital cities that are part of a 
fairly economically integrated West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), sharing 
a common currency (CFA Franc) with fixed parity to the Euro. The data were collected in 2001-
2002 in a context of relative political stability, low inflation (4.1%; 1999-2003 average: 2.1%) and 
reasonably high GDP growth in the WAEMU region (3.9%; 1999-2003 average: 2.4%) 
(UEMOA, 2004), which contrasted with the 2001 global economic slowdown. The exception is 
Côte d’Ivoire where political turmoil6 led to an economic downturn (virtually no growth in 2001, 
and an average of -0.8% in 1999-2003). Except in this country, the relative economic prosperity 
in 2001 is hypothesized to effect positively on wages and on compensating differentials.  
                                                 
6 The 1999 coup was followed by elections in 2000 and a military uprising in 2002 that led rebels to hold the 
Northern part of the country until 2004. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly study the 
theoretical arguments underlying the existence of compensating differentials and highlight some 
theoretical implications for our case study. In Section 3, we present the data drawn from the 1-2-
3 Surveys of the West African economic capitals and the construction of certain key variables for 
our analyses. Section 4 details our econometric models. The results of these analyses are 
discussed in Section 5 and our conclusions are put forward in Section 6.  
 
2. THEORETICAL VIEWS ON COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS 
There is a long history of economic research into the forces that narrow or widen wage 
differentials between individuals. The first models focused on competitive markets where they 
found wage premiums compensating non-pecuniary job attributes, such as working conditions, 
and differences in job stability across industries (Brown, 1980; Rosen, 1986; Murphy and Topel, 
1987). Most of the authors acknowledge that when job characteristics (other than wages) enter 
into players’ labor market decisions (firms and workers), then the market balance is due to the 
equalization of workers’ utilities rather than their wages. 
Rosen (1986) posits that the reasoning behind this is to be found in a simple supply and 
demand structure. Labor supply decisions are based on a trade-off between earned income 
(wages) and the cost of doing the job (stress, repetition, production deadlines, etc.) such that, at 
optimum, wage differences correspond to the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and working conditions. Labor demand decisions by firms are based on a trade-off 
between the necessity of paying the workers compensation commensurate with the strenuous or 
hazardous nature of their task and the need to improve the working conditions offered. 
Hence, under the assumptions of homogeneous individuals, heterogeneous work 
environments, perfect information with regard to wages and working conditions, and also perfect 
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mobility in the labor market, wages differ between workers such that they all obtain the same 
utility. To encourage workers to accept more adverse working conditions, firms therefore have to 
offer higher wages. This is the basic idea behind the theory of compensating wage differentials. 
Lifting the assumption of homogeneous individuals necessarily introduces a great deal of 
uncertainty as to the existence of compensation for working conditions when it is observed at 
the midpoint of the worker distribution. It could prove necessary to divide the population 
observed into more homogeneous groups, for example by using conditional wage quantiles. 
More recently, non-competitive theories have argued that wage deviations between 
apparently identical individuals tend more to reflect non-compensating differentials, such as the 
workers’ relative bargaining power (Daniel and Sofer, 1998; Manning, 2003) and the existence of 
efficiency wages (for a review, see Katz, 1986). Other recent hypotheses have pointed up the 
existence of information asymmetries, which allegedly increase the friction in the labor supply-
demand match (Hwang, Mortensen and Reed, 1998), and the existence of factor productivity 
differences between firms (Pissarides, 2000; Mortensen, 2003). 
Although some empirical studies focus on the relationship between wage structure and 
non-monetary job satisfaction,7 there is a patent paucity of research into the link between 
compensating differentials and observed job attributes, especially when it comes to distributional 
approaches. In the first study of this kind, Fernández and Nordman (2009) show that the 
compensating differential actually differs depending on the worker’s relative position in the 
earnings distribution. For example, pecuniary compensation for adverse working conditions 
could well be overestimated if the most capable (or resistant) workers are selected for 
employment statuses where these attributes are more commonplace. Moreover, given the 
assumption that the most capable individuals are also the most likely to receive efficiency wages, 
or to have a certain amount of bargaining power, working conditions could well have less to do 
                                                 
7 The studies on this issue often generate contradictory findings. See, for example, French and Dunlap (1998), Groot 
and Maassen van den Brink (1998), Lanfranchi et al. (2002), Magnani (2002), Bockerman and Ilmakunnas (2006), and 
Poggi (2007). 
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with the wage-setting process for these individuals than for other workers without these 
characteristics. More generally, workers could also find it easier to ask for premiums for adverse 
working conditions when the demand for labor exceeds the available manpower, creating a labor 
market imbalance that probably varies along the earnings distribution. 
 
3. DATA AND DEFINITION OF VULNERABILITY 
(a) The samples used 
The data used are taken from phase 1 of the 1-2-3 Surveys conducted by the PARSTAT, 
French acronym for the regional statistical assistance program for multilateral monitoring set up 
by the WAEMU Commission8. Data collection took place in the following economic capitals in 
2001-2002: Niamey (Niger), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Dakar (Senegal), Bamako (Mali), 
Cotonou (Benin), Lome (Togo) and Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire).9 
The sample was first of all restricted to all working-age individuals as defined by the 
International Labor Organization standards, i.e. 15 years old and over. We then reduced the 
samples further to individuals aged 15 and over with at least five years of potential labor market 
experience in order to take account of workers’ employment histories and thereby understand 
the longitudinal aspects of vulnerability. Potential experience is defined as the individual’s age 
minus the number of years of education and the six years theoretically preceding the start of 
school. The five-year potential experience span is broad enough to circumvent the problem of 
date measurement errors (end of education and end of previous job) and narrow enough to 
prevent the samples from being too small. 
[Table 1 here] 
                                                 
8 WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union.  
9 See Brilleau, Ouedraogo and Roubaud (2005) for details on the survey methodology.  
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The total sample (seven cities) is thereby reduced from 58,385 individuals aged 15 years 
and over to 50,772 individuals aged 15 years and over with five years or more of potential 
experience, and from 33,390 employed workers aged 15 and over to 32,314 employed workers 
aged 15 and over with five years or more of potential experience. Among these employed 
workers, we are only interested in private sector workers. The institutional sector – public, formal 
private or informal private sectors – is defined at the firm level, according to the SNA93 
definitions. A firm belongs to the informal private sector if it is not registered in the statistical or 
tax institution or if it does not keep written accounts. The formal private sector regression 
samples range from 302 to 950 workers (in Lome and Dakar) depending on the country, with a 
majority of dependent workers (employees). The informal private sector regression samples 
range from 2,230 to 3,492 workers (in Niamey and Dakar), with a majority of independent 
workers (self-employed and employers). 
(b) Construction of the vulnerability variables 
Our approach consists of using a number of employment status indicators for the 
individual (main and second job), which we believe best sum up the multifaceted nature of 
vulnerability in the main job. Business or production unit criteria (activity sector, business size 
and institutional sector) are not used as they reflect interfirm rather than interworker dualism. 
Worker vulnerability is therefore defined here by employment differentiation criteria. Nine 
dichotomous variables are built corresponding to different aspects of vulnerability. 
The first variable, called contractual insecurity, concerns the informal nature of the 
contract. This variable equals 1 if the individual has no written contract or does not receive a pay 
slip. It equals 0 if the individual has both a pay slip and a contract. It is not defined for 
independent workers, to whom it does not apply. Where workers have a contract, we make no 
distinction between those with a fixed-term contract and those with an open-ended contract. 
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The second variable concerns independent workers only. It is equal to 1 if an independent 
worker has no employees, wage-earning or otherwise. Self-employed professionals working alone 
in intellectual professions are not considered to be vulnerable. 
Adverse working conditions are assessed in terms of the place or premises where the 
individual works. This variable is equal to 1 if the individual’s main job is itinerant, worked from 
a makeshift or fixed street pitch, at the customer’s home or from the individual’s own home 
without having a dedicated set-up for the job. It is equal to 0 if the individual works using a 
vehicle, from home with a dedicated set-up for the job, in a public market or on business 
premises (including fields in the case of urban market gardening). Where certain jobs do not 
require premises even though they are not physically strenuous, the existence of premises, an 
office or a surgery is still taken as an indication of stability and non-adverse working conditions. 
To exclude all the intellectual professions from vulnerability in terms of working conditions 
would be tantamount to defining a vulnerable worker profile (comprising mainly roving street 
vendors and servants versus the intellectual professions). This would be inconsistent with the 
analysis of the many forms of vulnerability and its link with earnings. 
Casual labor is a source of vulnerability. Pagès (2003), who based her work on West 
African labor markets, states that vulnerability in employment “is polysemous and covers as 
much the different forms of underemployment as the lack of socioeconomic security at work 
associated more with institutional variables (employment contracts, compliance with labor code, 
etc.) and their time-related factors (casual and unstable employment).” So even if a job is 
protected or worked in good conditions, the casual nature of the employment means that this 
protection is not guaranteed over time and that the risk of visible underemployment is high. 
Therefore, a casual labor variable is created and is equal to 1 if the individual is a piece-rate, day 
or seasonal worker. It is equal to 0 if the individual has a steady job. 
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An unstable remuneration variable is equal to 1 if a dependent worker is not paid a fixed 
wage (monthly, fortnightly or weekly) or if an independent worker is not paid in the form of a 
fixed wage or profits (i.e. paid by the day, hour, piece rate, commission, in kind or not paid at all). 
This variable differs from the variable above. Workers in steady jobs may be paid erratically. 
They are then assumed to be more vulnerable since they cannot predict their situation in the 
coming days or weeks. 
Visible underemployment corresponds to a situation where an individual works less than 
the statutory working week when he would like to work more. The underemployment variable is 
equal to 1 if the individual works less than 35 hours and would like to work more. It is equal to 0 
otherwise. The interest in computing this variable lies in the fact that pecuniary compensation for 
vulnerability may depend on the workers bargaining power to secure daily, weekly or monthly 
earnings that will enable their household to survive, making total earnings virtually equal to those 
of employees working longer hours. 
Working a second job could, in certain cases, reflect underemployment or instability in the 
main job. Granted, public-sector and private-sector wage earners – often seen as not being 
vulnerable precisely because they work in these sectors – work a second job to earn money for 
their retirement or their children. Yet a visibly or invisibly underemployed individual or a piece-
rate worker may hold down a second job to keep money coming in when they are temporarily 
laid off from their main job. Working a second job may be seen as a way of reducing or 
spreading the risks of an income loss or decrease. The second job variable is equal to 1 if the 
individual works a vulnerable second job, i.e. outside the public sector, in a place or premises not 
dedicated to this job and in a firm of less than five people, and if the number of cumulative 
hours worked in the two jobs is 70 hours or more a week. 
Pagès (2005) emphasizes the importance of considering the dynamic aspect of 
vulnerability. The above employment situation impacts on the workers’ capacities and behavior 
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(the skills-employment causality is reversed). The author measures the dynamic facet of 
vulnerability at work in terms of labor mobility and employment integration. Similarly, we define 
two dynamic vulnerability criteria. 
Instability in employment is defined by a change of job without an improvement or with a 
drop in status in the last five years. This variable is equal to 0 if the individual is in his or her first 
job or has found a job following a period of unemployment or inactivity over the last five years. 
It is also equal to 0 if the individual has been in the same job for five years. Lastly, it is equal to 0 
if the individual has changed job with an improvement in job status (from the point of view of 
socioeconomic group, reflecting upward professional mobility) in the last five years. However, it 
is equal to 1 when the individual has changed job in the last five years without an improvement 
in status (drop in or identical socioeconomic group). The adopted status hierarchy is as follows, 
from top to bottom: senior executives, engineers or equivalent; middle managers and 
supervisors, skilled and semi-skilled non-manual and manual employees; unskilled workers; 
apprentices and family workers. In the case of an independent-dependent worker transition, the 
reason for the change of job – voluntary or involuntary – is used to determine whether the 
transition represents an upwardly mobile professional move or not. 
An unwanted job is defined as a job with which the worker is dissatisfied and which the 
worker has taken on following an involuntary departure from the previous job. Job 
dissatisfaction is measured by the answer to a question about the individual’s aspirations (keep or 
change job and, if the interviewee is willing to change, for what type of job). An unwanted job is 
more probably occupied due to constraints and is hence mismatched with the worker’s expertise, 
skills and preferences. Workers may be dissatisfied in their jobs because they are overqualified 
for it, because their working conditions are physically strenuous, because the hours are unsuitable 
for them, etc. Working an unwanted job may therefore indicate a subsistence job, a “stopgap 
job” taken in the hope of immediate gains. 
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Other potential vulnerability criteria have not been taken into account. For example, we do 
not create a social security variable as Pagès does (2005), since our income variable includes all 
welfare benefits. However, unstable remuneration or no written contract, for example, should be 
enough to reflect the worker’s social insecurity.  
So for each employment status (dependent or independent), we define the intensity of 
vulnerability I as the sum of the eight previously defined criteria applicable to this status. 
Maximum vulnerability intensity ranges from 4 to 7 depending on the city and sector. No city 
posts the maximum score of 8 whereby all the vulnerability criteria applicable to a status are 
fulfilled. 
A dichotomous dummy variable for vulnerability, built by setting a vulnerability threshold 
(a minimum number of vulnerability criteria to be met to be deemed vulnerable), would have 
simplified our measurement. However, the effect of vulnerability on income might be nonlinear 
and a dichotomous dummy variable would not show this up. The fact that workers fulfill one or 
two vulnerability criteria may be due to constraints imposed on them on the labor market. 
However, whereas a certain level of vulnerability might be imposed on the worker, it might also 
be chosen by the same worker who prefers to be more vulnerable for higher earnings. 
(c) Descriptive statistics 
[Table 2 here] 
Contractual insecurity concerns virtually all (97%) of the dependent workers in the 
informal sector. More surprisingly, it affects half of the employees in the formal private sector: A 
total of 40% do not have written contracts or pay slips. Similarly, 23% of the dependent workers 
in the formal private sector and 60% of the dependent workers in the informal private sector do 
not receive a fixed wage. This implies that the distinction between formal private firms and 
informal private firms is not enough to analyze workers’ living and working conditions. 
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The main sources of vulnerability among independent workers in the informal sector are 
adverse working conditions (59% of independent workers), in terms of no dedicated premises or 
workplace, and own-account employment, i.e. not having any employees (68% of independent 
workers). These percentages are small in the formal private sector, where self-employed workers 
are a minority (less than 20%) in all cities. 
A total of 17% of dependent private sector workers and 14% of independent private sector 
workers are not at all vulnerable since they do not fulfill one single vulnerability criterion. Yet 
these rates mask huge differences between the formal and informal sectors. In the informal 
sector alone, the rates fall to 2% and 12% respectively. So 85% of the private sector workers in 
all the economic capitals studied are vulnerable on the basis of at least one criterion. 
[Chart 1a here] [Chart 1b here] 
Chart 1a (resp. Chart 1b) shows the log of average earnings in the formal private sector 
(resp. informal sector) for each level of vulnerability, without any control of the workers’ 
individual characteristics. The income curves are not linear in vulnerability intensity in either 
sector. For a vulnerability level of over 5, the earnings curves for the different capitals’ informal 
sectors display different trends with sudden slope changes. These cannot be interpreted since 
they are based on very low observation numbers. Similarly, the shape of the formal private sector 
curves above vulnerability level 4 cannot be interpreted. 
For all the cities and sectors, the earnings curves are convex around a point of inflection 
situated near a vulnerability intensity of 2 or 3. It could be that the job market restricts all 
workers to an “incompressible” vulnerability level regardless of their aptitudes and networks. 
However, higher earnings are found at a vulnerability level of over 2 or 3. Above this 
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vulnerability level, then, workers appear to be able to negotiate premium pay for their 
vulnerability.10 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES 
In a first step, the determinants of vulnerability are analyzed using a simple linear model 
whose dependent variable is the intensity of vulnerability. The explanatory variables introduced 
are dummy variables for the individual’s status in the household (1 if household head) and the 
institutional sector in which the individual’s father (public, formal private or informal private) 
worked when the individual was 15 years old. These first variables are denoted Z. The set of 
control variables included in all the estimated equations (X) covers gender, education (number of 
years of successfully completed education) and its square, potential experience and its square, 
religion (Christian, reference: Muslim), migratory status (rural, urban or foreign migrant, 
reference: native of the city studied), marital status (conjugal status, reference: widowed, divorced 
or single), seniority in the firm or main job and its square, and independent status (self-employed 
employer or own-account worker versus dependent worker). 
Secondly, to examine the existence of compensating wage differentials for vulnerability, we 
estimate the log of the hourly wage rate for the main job for each city. Included in this wage rate 
are rare benefits offered to few by a small part of the formal sector such as year-end bonuses, 
profit-sharing, paid leave, medical service benefit, social security, and benefits in kind such as 
                                                 
10 Additional statistics were computed to describe the workers’ individual and job characteristics depending on their 
relative position in the earnings distribution (not shown). In the formal sector, while the upper tail of the earnings 
distribution (fourth quartile) corresponds to less vulnerable jobs, this relationship is not necessarily observed for each 
specific criterion of vulnerability. For instance, there is no clear pattern between earnings deciles and the fact of 
having a second vulnerable job, an unstable job, being an independent with no employees, or knowing a situation of 
visible underemployment. In the informal sector, there is no significant correlation between higher earnings and 
having unstable remuneration, employment instability, exerting a second vulnerable job, having an unwanted job and 
enduring adverse working conditions. 
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housing, electricity, and transport.11 The wage rate is calculated from the monthly earnings for 
the reference month and the number of hours worked per week.12 
(a) Quantitative approach 
We talk about a quantitative approach when we study the impact of vulnerability intensity 
on income. In this approach, what counts is the cumulative number of vulnerability criteria 
fulfilled by an individual rather than such or such a criterion.  
Let E be all four institutional sector categories (h=1: zero income, h=2: public sector, h=3: 
formal private sector, and h=4: informal sector). Our purpose is to estimate the effect 
( )hhh 21 ,ϕϕϕ =  of vulnerability I on earnings in the formal and informal private sectors using:  
hhhhh IIXY εϕϕβ +++= 221 , 4,3=∀h       (1) 
The introduction of a second-degree vulnerability intensity polynomial13 is designed to take 
into account any nonlinearity in the effect of vulnerability on income. Yh is only observed if the 
individual has a paid job and if sector h is chosen by the individual.14  
Given that the labor markets in developing countries are potentially segmented15, sector 
entry selection may exist in addition to labor market entry selection, calling for a selection model. 
We use the Lee (1983) model, an extension of the Heckman method, to estimate the earnings 
equation with multinomial selection. This method corrects the selection bias, by estimating: 
                                                 
11 These benefits are not to be confused with bonuses rewarding productivity as they are usually included in the 
contract offered by some firms. 
12 Earning misreporting was expected and has been partially avoided in the 1-2-3 Surveys. For example, the 
interviewers were asked to help self-employed workers reconstitute their earnings by recapping incomings and 
outgoings over a reference period to which the interviewee could relate (for further details, see Kuepie et al., 2009). 
13 The introduction of a third-degree polynomial into the earnings equations was tested, but did not find evidence 
that vulnerability has a cubic effect on income. Dummy variables were also introduced for each vulnerability level to 
test for nonlinearity, but this made it harder to interpret the estimated coefficients with no added explanatory power. 
14 The earnings Yh and vulnerability index I are defined at the individual level. We just omit the subscript i to lighten 
the notations. 
15 We make the assumption that the potential segmentation of the urban labor markets manifests itself essentially 
across the institutional sectors of employment, i.e. across the public, formal private and informal sectors, thus 
allowing workers to freely move from one job to another within each institutional sector.   
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hhhhhh IIXY κλϕϕβ ++++= 221   4,3=∀h      (2) 
where hλ , a generalization of the inverse Mills ratio in Heckman’s method, corrects the selection 
bias generated by the fact that belonging to sector h rather than sector k (k ≠ h) may be due to 
the action of unobservable variables also associated with income.  
In our model, the identifying variables required for the robustness of the selection model 
are the inverse of the dependency ratio (number of employed workers to household size), two 
dummy variables indicating whether the individual’s father went to primary school and whether 
the individual’s head of household is a woman. These variables are introduced into the selection 
equation (multinomial logit model with four categories for h: 1…4), but not into the earnings 
equation. The assumption is that these variables only influence income via sector allocation. Let 
us briefly comment on this identification strategy. 
One may argue that father’s schooling is not an appropriate instrument for sector 
allocation if father’s schooling measured the father’s ability to nurture unobserved ability in his 
child that would effect on his child’s earnings. This may be true if the father’s education was 
affecting educational choice for more able children. Yet, in a study of the returns to education 
using the same dataset, Kuepie, Nordman and Roubaud (2009) have shown that the father’s 
characteristics (either dummies for his level of education or dummies for his work status) were 
never significant in the earnings functions. The authors then cast doubt on the validity of using 
the father’s characteristics as proxies for ability – or more generally heterogeneity – of his 
children with these data. In our case, father’s schooling is employed as an exclusion restriction 
instead. In addition, we believe that the household’s dependency ratio, as well as the sex of the 
household head, can be considered as exogenous to individual earnings. Similar assumptions are 
made by Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) or Kuepie et al. (2009). In order to preserve 
as much comparability across countries as possible, we rely on the same exclusion restrictions for 
each city and sector. However, bearing in mind the methodological controversies surrounding 
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the choice of identifying variables in general, we report summary results from uncorrected 
earnings functions (OLS) as well.  
A second problem that needs to be solved is that the intensity of vulnerability is potentially 
endogenous. Unobservable characteristics may affect both the explanatory variable for 
vulnerability and the level of earnings. This would be case, for example, if less (best) performing 
workers, a characteristic all too often unobserved in the surveys, were selected for employment 
statuses where vulnerability is the most widespread (see Section 2). In this case, any positive 
effect vulnerability might have on earnings could be under-(over-)estimated. Since disregarding 
this factor could produce non-convergent estimators of ( )hhh , 21 ϕϕϕ = , I needs to be 
instrumented. 
To do this, we use the control function method rather than the two-stage least squares 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). Where income is nonlinear in the potentially endogenous variable, 
this method provides more accurate estimators than the two-stage least squares method (Card, 
2001). The control function method involves regressing, in a first step, the intensity of 
vulnerability on the individual characteristics X and on the instrumental variables Z, not 
correlated with κ , the residual from the earnings equation (2). The estimated residual from this 
first linear regression, µˆ , is introduced as an explanatory variable, controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, into the earnings equation. 
The chosen instruments are the dummy variable for the status of the head of household 
and three dummy variables for the institutional sector of the father when the individual was 15 
years old. In principle, these variables do not have a direct impact on earned income since they 
have nothing to do with productivity or the worker’s capacities. Yet, being a head of household 
could form an incentive to accept a more vulnerable job when faced with the urgent need to find 
a job to feed the family or a less vulnerable job to guarantee stability for the household. The 
heads of household could have a longer term horizon than other individuals in the household. 
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They may see things more in the long run, be less drawn by immediate gains than other members 
of the household who would prefer an immediate gain at the cost of a vulnerable job, all things 
being equal. 
We also believe that exogenous sources of variation can be obtained with the father’s 
occupation when the worker was 15 years old. It is indeed likely that the type of job held by the 
father when the worker was younger will influence his child’s leaning to take up a good or a bad 
job, in the sense of a more or less vulnerable work situation. There is no determinism implied in 
this process but simply the assumption that the father’s professional situation has somehow an 
influence on his child’s future preference for certain job attributes or capacity to cope with 
transition periods (for instance aversion, liking or resistance to adverse working conditions).   
(b) Distributional approach 
The impact of vulnerability on income may differ across the earnings distribution (see 
Section 2). Quantile regressions are used to take into account these potential effects. Firstly, the 
estimation of equation (1) is resumed using conditional quantiles, such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2212 ),,( IIXIIXYq hhhh τϕτϕτβτ ++=   4,3=∀h  (3) 
where ),,( 2IIXYq hτ  is the τ th conditional quantile of hY  and where vector ( )τβhˆ  and the 
estimated coefficients ( )τϕ h1ˆ  and ( )τϕ h2ˆ  provide the effects of the different regressors at the τ th 
quantile of the earnings distribution in sector h. 
This framework does not take selection effects into account. Whereas the control function 
method can also be used in the case of quantile regression, to our knowledge, no model 
equivalent to Lee’s exists that can estimate quantile regressions with multinomial selection. Then, 
this distributional approach corrects solely the supposed endogeneity of vulnerability.16  
                                                 
16 This is not a major drawback since, as we will see in Section 5, the results of the quantitative approach are not 
sensitive to the consideration of a possible selection effect. 
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(c) Qualitative approach 
To build a cumulative index of vulnerability intensity is to assume that all the criteria 
involved in vulnerability have the same weight. Is income influenced by the number of 
vulnerability criteria satisfied or the existence of one given vulnerability criterion? Moreover, 
certain vulnerability criteria (such as casual labor and unstable remuneration) are potentially 
collinear, invalidating the coherence of the cumulative index and introducing all the criteria into 
the earnings equations. We therefore put the vulnerability criteria through a principal component 
analysis (PCA) to extract orthogonal factor axes.17 PCA is conducted separately for independent 
workers and dependent workers. For each of these two statuses, the first four axes are taken so 
that all the criteria are sufficiently well represented by the axes (all contribute to at least one axis 
to the tune of 50% or more) and such that the variance explained by the chosen axes is 
approximately 60%. In keeping with the method used in Jellal et al. (2008), these axes are then 
introduced into the earnings equations. 
The axes generated by the PCA of dependent workers are not defined for independent 
workers (and vice versa). One way of introducing them into the earnings equation is to conduct a 
separate regression for each subsample of dependent and independent workers. This solution 
can only apply to the informal sector, but not to the formal private sector due to the small 
numbers involved. Another solution is to cross the factor variable with the status dummy 
variable. Let D1 be the first vulnerability axis extracted by the PCA on dependent workers. The 
value D1 for each dependent worker is their co-ordinate on this axis. For an independent worker, 
this variable is equal to zero. The two options were tested and produced very similar results, so 
we only present the results of crossing the factor axes with the independent or dependent status. 
 
 
                                                 
17 We tried many other techniques of factor analysis. They lead to similar conclusions. 
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5.RESULTS 
(a) Quantitative approach 
Let us first describe the effects of the instruments on the vulnerability index.18 For each 
city and each sector, at least one instrument is found to have a significant effect on vulnerability, 
except in the formal private sectors of Niamey and Bamako.19  
For instance, in the formal private sector, the impact of the head of household’s status is 
negative and significant in Ouagadougou, Dakar and Abidjan, and significantly positive in 
Cotonou. In the informal sector, its impact is negative in the seven cities, but not significant in 
Dakar and Cotonou. While the father’s institutional sector does not predict well the intensity of 
vulnerability for workers in the formal sector, the quality of the father’s institutional sector 
instrument is better since it appears to influence vulnerability in five out of seven cases, i.e. 
except in Lome and Abidjan. By and large, however, we note the satisfactory quality of our 
instruments since the condition required to correlate the instruments with the endogenous 
variable is satisfied.  
(i) Effects of vulnerability on earnings 
Let us now look at the effect of vulnerability on earnings based on models (1), (2) and their 
extension taking into account an endogenous vulnerability variable.  
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of the vulnerability indicator on earnings, calculated at 
the average vulnerability point.20 Regardless of whether or not the sample selection and 
endogeneity of vulnerability are corrected, the marginal effect of average vulnerability is negative 
in both sectors for all the cities except in the informal sector in Dakar, where this effect is slightly 
                                                 
18 The results, not shown to save space, are available from the authors upon request. 
19 Hence, the estimates corrected for the endogeneity of vulnerability need to be interpreted with more caution in the 
case of these two cities’ formal sectors given the inefficient instrumental variable procedure in both cases. 
20 All the regression tables are available from the authors. 
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positive. In both sectors, formal and informal private, the selection correction barely alters the 
results. However, the vulnerability endogeneity correction alters the magnitude of the marginal 
effects (we come back to this point below). 
In the formal private sector, one additional point of vulnerability reduces income by 16% 
(Cotonou) to 34% (Dakar).21 In the informal sector, the marginal effect of vulnerability on 
earnings is smaller. If the endogeneity of vulnerability had not been taken into account, the effect 
of vulnerability on income would have been deemed negligible. However, once the endogeneity 
of vulnerability is included, it has a large impact on earnings. One additional point of 
vulnerability reduces income by 3% (Cotonou) to 20% (Abidjan). The marginal effect is positive 
in Dakar only. For example, if workers vulnerability intensity were to increase from 2 points to 3 
points, their earnings would increase an average 1%. 
(ii) The convex effect of vulnerability on earnings 
These marginal effects are calculated for average vulnerability intensity. In the formal 
private sector, workers satisfy one in eight vulnerability criteria on average. In the informal 
sector, this average vulnerability point is close to 2. Hence, if we wanted to identify any 
compensating effects for higher than average vulnerability levels, we would have to study the 
coefficients estimated for the second-degree vulnerability intensity polynomial. 
[Table 4 here] [Table 5 here] 
 Tables 4 and 5 show that, regardless of the model used, vulnerability has a negative effect 
on earnings in all the cities and in both institutional sectors. However, in these two sectors in all 
the cities, the effect of vulnerability is nonlinear and convex since the coefficient of I2 is positive 
and significant. This quadratic effect is significant at least at the 5% level and mostly at the 1% 
level in all the cities and sectors, except in the formal private sector in Bamako. In formal 
                                                 
21 Bear in mind that caution is called for when considering the estimation corrected for endogeneity in the case of 
the formal sector in Bamako (37%). 
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Bamako businesses, vulnerability squared has no significant impact on earnings, just like first-
degree vulnerability. 
So the convexity observed in the descriptive analysis holds in the formal and informal 
private sectors once the individual’s characteristics, selection and endogeneity are controlled for. 
It can be seen in charts 2a and 2b, which represent the average income predicted by the Lee 
model with endogenisation of vulnerability by vulnerability level (the curves produced by the 
OLS model and the simple Lee model are similar). 
[Chart 2a here] [Chart 2b here] 
 In the formal private sector, income is convex in vulnerability intensity in all the capitals. 
The slope is markedly decreasing for low levels of vulnerability. A change of sign only appears at 
vulnerability levels that are not well represented in terms of numbers (4 or more). In other 
words, income losses due to vulnerability are lower for high levels of vulnerability, but do not 
translate into gains. In Cotonou, however, the level of gains for a vulnerability of 4 is similar to 
the level of gains obtained for zero vulnerability. 
In the informal sector, convexity is observed for all the cities. The earnings curves even 
steepen above a vulnerability level of 2. In all the cities, average predicted income for a 
vulnerability of 4 or 5 is higher than the average predicted income for a vulnerability of 2. In 
Cotonou, the average predicted income for a vulnerability of 5 is even higher than the average 
predicted income for workers who are not vulnerable at all. 
The assumption that earnings can compensate for a certain level of vulnerability therefore 
holds in the informal sector22. Workers with a vulnerability level of 2 endure this vulnerability, 
                                                 
22 We think differences between sectors are not concerned by earnings misreporting. Because a large majority of 
workers in both the formal and the informal sectors are not regularly paid, have no pay slip or are reticent to disclose 
their earnings, measure bias can occur in both sectors. But even if under-reporting was more important in the 
informal private sector, this would lead to accentuate our results. First, assuming vulnerability is correlated with 
under reported earnings would imply that any compensation effects would be in fact more important than observed 
effects. Second, higher under-reporting in the informal sector means that the real compensation in the informal 
private sector would be more pronounced than the one observed. 
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which is imposed on them by the labor market. The more vulnerable workers are better paid. In 
keeping with the theory of compensating wage differentials for dependent workers’ jobs (see 
Section 2), this finding can be explained by the fact that their employers are encouraged to offer 
higher earnings to find employees prepared to work in such vulnerable jobs. For the independent 
workers, vulnerability can be a way of earning more immediate gains from their work. For 
example, some independent workers may choose not to have work premises, making their 
working conditions more vulnerable, if the itinerant nature of their work brings them into 
contact with more customers or if it means that they do not have to worry about paying rent or 
whatever taxes. Without these vulnerable conditions, their business would probably be not 
sustainable.  
In the informal sector of all cities, the marginal effect at average vulnerability is negative, 
except in Dakar where it is slightly positive. The average vulnerability points (approximately 2) 
are close to the minima of the convex curves. At these average points, income is a decreasing 
function of vulnerability. Yet above these points, earnings are an increasing function of 
vulnerability. A not-inconsiderable proportion of workers are found above the average 
vulnerability level. Depending on the cities, from 27% to 62% of the workers in the formal 
private sector are more vulnerable than average (respectively in Abidjan and Cotonou) and from 
38% to 65% of informal sector workers are more vulnerable than average (respectively in 
Niamey and Lome). Therefore, the compensation (or rather lesser-loss mechanism) for high 
levels of vulnerability concerns a sizable share of workers. 
To sum up the vulnerability effect on earnings, the labor market of the cities studied 
imposes a minimum level of vulnerability. This non-compensated vulnerability, common to 
nearly all the workers, is a characteristic of the job markets in these cities. The average level 
vulnerability is not a wage bargaining element or a profit adjustment variable for the independent 
worker. However, workers can negotiate wage compensation for above-average levels of 
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vulnerability. If dependent workers consider that they are more vulnerable than their fellow 
citizens on average, they are in a position to negotiate premium pay. If the market imposes a 
certain level of vulnerability on independent workers, they will be inclined to make their jobs that 
bit more vulnerable to earn a higher income since, the way things stand, they “might as well”. 
(iii) The endogeneity of vulnerability in the earnings function 
In all the cities’ formal private sectors, the impact of vulnerability is all the more negative 
when the endogeneity of vulnerability is controlled for (Table 4). However, significance also 
drops, except in Dakar. The underestimation of the negative impact of vulnerability implies that 
the workers have unobservable characteristics both positively correlated with their earnings and 
with the intensity of their vulnerability. These unobservables may reflect the dependent workers’ 
ability and/or bargaining capacities, but also their household’s situation. For example, dependent 
workers who have strong ability and bargaining power are capable of negotiating wage rises to 
compensate for adverse working conditions and may also be more able to cope with difficult 
work situations. On the other hand, a worker with an extended social network and/or whose 
household is capable of coping with shocks would be in a better position to negotiate working 
conditions and earnings. For instance, an individual with extended social network or whose 
household can respond to shocks has the bargaining power and time to negotiate higher earnings 
in case of bad working conditions. 
In the informal sector, the negative impact of vulnerability disappears in the cities of Dakar 
and Cotonou when the endogeneity of vulnerability is corrected for: its coefficient is no longer 
significantly different from zero (Table 5). In the five other cities, vulnerability has a more 
pronounced negative impact on income once endogeneity is controlled for. Unobservable 
characteristics are again at work here, affecting the intensity of vulnerability and the level of 
earnings. This sector is made up mainly of independent workers, for whom bargaining power is 
not so relevant. However, the interpretation in terms of social insecurity holds. An independent 
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worker without an extended social network who is shaken by a household shock cannot develop 
a viable, stable or profitable business, for lack of time to invest, conduct market studies, etc. 
Lastly, the use of the control function provides a direct test of the assumption of the 
endogeneity of vulnerability in the earnings function. The significance of the coefficient assigned 
to the correction term µˆ  (the vulnerability equation residual) indicates whether the unexplained 
variation in vulnerability intensity also affects the variation in the level of individual earnings. In 
other words, in the cases where this coefficient is significant, the assumption of endogeneity of 
vulnerability cannot be rejected. The findings for the informal sector (Table 5) confirm that, in 
the four out of seven cases (Ouagadougou, Bamako, Lome and Abidjan), the endogeneity of 
vulnerability cannot be rejected. This contrasts with the diagnosis for the formal private sector 
(Table 4), where endogeneity has to be rejected in six of seven cases, the exception being Dakar. 
In the following, however, rather than using a method for each sector and each city, we refer to 
estimations derived from models corrected for endogeneity in all cases in order to maintain 
uniform treatment for all the cities studied. 
(b) Distributional approach 
[Chart 3a here] [Chart 3b here] 
This approach involves estimating model (3) for a certain number of income quantiles (see 
Section 4b). For simplicity of presentation, we only report on the series of marginal effects at the 
average vulnerability point calculated by income deciles in charts 3a and 3b, respectively for the 
formal and informal private sectors. The curves presented are the third-degree trend curves, 
which are more flexible than the quadratic function. The marginal effects are calculated using the 
coefficients resulting from the quantile regressions, taking into account the endogeneity of 
vulnerability.  
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In the formal private sector, the marginal effect of average vulnerability is negative across 
the entire distribution. This means that there is no compensating mechanism in the formal 
private sector at the average point. The cities of Niamey, Ouagadougou, Dakar, Cotonou and 
Lome present the same concave and then convex marginal effect curves; the points of inflection 
being close to median earnings in the distributions. The Bamako’s curve differs. It is solely 
concave and reaches its maximum for median earnings and a greater marginal effect than the 
other curves. However, one additional point of vulnerability prompts a 10% decrease in the 
earnings of an individual with average vulnerability in the fifth decile of the distribution. 
Abidjan’s curve is slightly convex at the lower tail of the distribution and then concave. The 
marginal effect of vulnerability on earnings varies little along the distribution in Abidjan (from 
20% to 30% income loss). 
In the informal sector, Dakar, Cotonou and Bamako present a rising and mainly concave 
curve of the marginal effect of vulnerability along the conditional distribution of earnings. 
Moreover, the marginal effect becomes positive as of the third decile in Dakar and as of the sixth 
decile in Cotonou and Bamako. Hence for Dakar workers in the seventh decile with an average 
level of vulnerability, a one-point increase in vulnerability drives an average 25% increase in 
earnings. In Cotonou, a one-point increase in the vulnerability of workers in the ninth decile with 
average vulnerability generates an average increase of 15% to 20% in earnings. Lastly, Bamako 
returns a lower, but not negligible, effect since the increase in earnings can be as high as nearly 
5% for workers in the eighth decile. In the other cities (Niamey, Ouagadougou, Lome and 
Abidjan), one additional degree of vulnerability produces no increase in earnings compared with 
average vulnerability, regardless of distribution position.  
To sum up, Dakar, Cotonou and – to a lesser extent – Bamako display both the highest 
compensation for vulnerability, in terms of earnings for high levels of vulnerability, and positive 
effects of vulnerability on high earnings for average levels of vulnerability. Hence in these three 
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cities’ informal sectors, vulnerability has a different effect on income depending on the worker’s 
relative position on the remuneration scale. For equal observable characteristics, workers at the 
lower tail of the earnings distribution (poor) are penalized in monetary terms for their 
vulnerability whereas workers at the upper tail of the distribution (rich) are not and receive 
compensation for their vulnerability. This can be explained by greater bargaining power among 
the independent workers at the upper tail of the earnings distribution. The poorest independent 
workers cannot raise their income to compensate for the vulnerability of their work since, 
without room for maneuver, they cannot adopt a strategy to increase their profits. An 
independent worker at the upper tail of the earnings distribution could more easily make trade-
offs between working conditions and earnings.  
(c) ‘Qualitative’ approach 
The approach taken up to this point cannot distinguish between the different roles of each 
aspect of vulnerability. There is a possibility that only certain facets of vulnerability are behind 
the compensating phenomena found above. The analysis therefore focuses on the different 
vulnerability criteria using a factor analysis (see Section 4c). 
(i) Results of the principal component analysis 
[Table 6 here] 
The first PCA factor axis for dependent workers is defined mainly by the informal nature 
of the contract, casual labor and unstable remuneration, and adverse working conditions 
(Table 6). This axis hence covers three aspects of vulnerability: contractual insecurity, adverse 
working conditions and the casual nature of employment. The second axis defines subsistence 
and stopgap jobs. Having lost their previous job, workers find themselves on a downward 
professional slope and accept the first job offer, which is far from being the job they want. This 
job may therefore be mismatched with their skills. The third axis for dependent workers is 
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underemployment since the variables that contribute the most to it are visible underemployment 
and casual labor. Underemployment is associated with piece-rate work and day work, since a 
casual worker finds it hard to work full time and is therefore subject to low demand. The fourth 
axis is working a second highly vulnerable job. Working a second highly vulnerable job is a 
reflection of vulnerability in the main job, as distinct from the vulnerability induced by 
underemployment, since the third and fourth axes are orthogonal. 
The first PCA axis for independent workers corresponds to the second axis for dependent 
workers, the subsistence job axis. The second axis covers underemployment. Unlike the 
underemployment axis for dependent workers, here the unstable remuneration variable 
contributes to the axis. When their work is not steady, the remuneration of independent workers 
is automatically variable since own-account workers and self-employed employers find it hard to 
smooth their income. The third axis for independent workers covers having no employees, a 
variable defined solely for these workers, and adverse working conditions. This axis characterizes 
itinerant jobs low on physical capital (low on physical capital since there are no work premises 
and low labor factor since worked by just one person), such as repairers and roving street 
vendors. The fourth axis is the same as the fourth axis for dependent workers: working a second 
highly vulnerable job. 
(ii) Earnings equations with the factor axes 
The summary results of earnings functions including factor axes crossed with independent 
or dependent status (see Section 4c) are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Since the OLS and Lee 
models produce similar results, we only report on the Lee model results here. 
[Table 7 here] [Table 8 here] 
The independent workers’ axes very rarely play a significant role in the formal private 
sector due to the small proportion of independent workers in this sector. We therefore do not 
comment on these coefficients. 
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The contractual insecurity and adverse working conditions axis has a definitely negative 
and highly significant impact (at 1%) on the earnings of dependent workers in the formal private 
sector in all the economic capitals. The impact of dependent workers employed in a subsistence 
job, taken on as a last resort, is significantly negative in Niamey (at 5%), Bamako (at 5%) and 
Abidjan (at 5%). In the other cities, its impact is not significantly different from zero. The 
underemployment axis has a positive and highly significant effect on earnings in the formal 
private sector in all the cities except Dakar, where the effect is not significant. Lastly, working a 
second job has no impact on the income earned in the main job. 
The contractual insecurity axis has a negative and significant impact (except in Bamako) on 
the earnings of dependent workers in the informal sector. The underemployment axis positively 
and significantly affects the earnings of dependent workers in the informal sector in all the cities. 
For these workers, the subsistence job axis coefficient is never significantly different to zero and 
the coefficient for working a second vulnerable job is only significantly negative in Cotonou. 
The subsistence job axis has no clear effect on the earnings of independent workers in the 
informal sector. However, underemployment here again has a significantly positive impact on the 
earnings of independent workers in the informal sectors of the seven cities, while the axis 
defined by zero employees and adverse working conditions has a significantly negative impact at 
the 1% level in all the cities except Dakar. Working a second job has a significantly negative 
impact on earnings, except in Ouagadougou. 
Different aspects of vulnerability therefore have different impacts on earnings. For 
example, subsistence jobs tend to have a negative effect in the formal sector, although it is rarely 
significant. Working a second job has a negative effect on the earnings of independent workers 
in the informal sector, but no impact in the formal private sector. So working a second 
vulnerable job would be a sign of main job vulnerability in the informal sector, a way of 
diversifying excessive risks. However, for a worker in the formal private sector, working a second 
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vulnerable job is not a sign of lower earnings in the main job, but a “sideline” to prepare for 
formal retirement, just like public sector workers. Lastly, there is no compensation for 
contractual insecurity among dependent workers or for itinerant, solitary work among 
independent workers in any of the cities or the institutional sectors. 
Visible underemployment has a positive impact on the earnings of dependent workers in 
both sectors and independent workers in the informal sector. Here, then, a pecuniary 
compensating mechanism for vulnerability is at work. Employers cannot pay their employees 
exactly pro rata to the hours worked if the number of hours worked is constrained by customer 
demand and not by the employee’s wishes. Employees will negotiate to bring their earnings up to 
the minimum living wage, even if this is supposed to be earned from a greater number of hours 
than those actually worked. For independent workers, a possible explanation for this 
compensation is that independents worker will bill their services in a way that will give them a 
certain level of earnings, regardless of the number of hours worked. Lastly, underemployed 
workers may have made less of an effort to work more than the individuals who work longer 
than the statutory working week, simply because their hourly wage is higher. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we develop indicators of employment vulnerability in seven West African 
economic capitals (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou) and 
study their links with individual earnings from the main job. The theory of compensating 
differentials, formalized in the 1980s, states that workers may receive pecuniary compensation 
commensurate with the strenuous or hazardous nature of their tasks or adverse working 
conditions. A certain number of empirical studies have recently found evidence of this type of 
compensation in developed countries, but often with contradictory conclusions. Our 
33 
interpretation of the link between employment status and income draws on these developments, 
applying them not just to working conditions themselves, but more broadly to vulnerability in 
employment (contractual insecurity, working conditions, underemployment, and stopgap jobs 
mismatched with individual characteristics). Employment vulnerability is a dominant 
characteristic of the urban labor markets in sub-Saharan Africa, where the overwhelming 
majority of workers work in insecure jobs and/or in the informal sector. Our composite 
indicator of vulnerability in employment reveals that 85% of the private sector workers in all the 
economic capitals studied are vulnerable on the basis of at least one criterion. This would suggest 
that all the cities’ labor markets impose a minimum level of vulnerability. 
Our analysis of the effects of vulnerability on earnings is in turn quantitative, distributional 
and qualitative. The quantitative analysis finds that the impact of vulnerability on earnings is 
generally negative for an average level of vulnerability despite a relative economic prosperity in 
the year 2001 when the data were collected. In the formal private sector, income losses due to 
vulnerability are lower for high levels of vulnerability, but do not translate into gains. In the 
informal sector, however, the average predicted income for high vulnerability is higher than the 
average predicted income for relatively low vulnerability. The assumption that average earnings 
may compensate for a certain level of vulnerability cannot be rejected in the informal sector. This 
could partly explain why the informal sector is attracting more workers than the formal sector. 
This compensation or lesser-loss mechanism for high levels of vulnerability is moreover found to 
concern a not-inconsiderable share of workers. However, imposed ‘minimum’ vulnerability is not 
compensated for since it is common to nearly all workers: it is an inherent characteristic of the 
job markets in these cities.  
Regarding the absence of compensating mechanisms in the formal private sector, one may 
think of it as a consequence of the long “job queue” at this sector’s entry (see the influential 
theoretical model of Thurow, 1972). Indeed, for years, the existence of significant rents in the 
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formal sector in these countries is known to be so high that it is rational for individuals to queue 
for a formal sector job. The massive decrease in access to public jobs is common to many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, confronted since the early 1980s with a serious crisis in public 
finances and engaged in structural adjustment policies. This difficulty to access formal sector 
jobs23 then certainly reduces workers’ bargaining power once they have the chance to become 
insiders.  
The abovementioned marginal effects are estimated by regressions on the earnings average, 
which conceals variations in the magnitude of the impact of vulnerability along the earnings 
distribution. Our quantile regressions find evidence that the impact of vulnerability on earnings is 
not uniform, particularly in the informal sector. For example, in the informal sectors in Dakar, 
Cotonou and Bamako, the marginal effect of average vulnerability is positive for the upper 
deciles of the earnings distribution. Informal sector in these cities – Dakar, Cotonou and, to a 
lesser extent, Bamako – display both the highest compensation for high levels of vulnerability 
and positive effects of average vulnerability on income among the highest earnings. 
Compensating wage differentials are then found for earnings at the upper tail of the 
distribution. The compensating mechanism does not concern the poorest workers. Although the 
poorest dependent workers should be the most forceful in wage bargaining in an endeavor to 
earn a living wage, they have less bargaining power due to the urgent nature of their needs. 
Urban labor market imbalances could also explain this absence of compensating wage 
differentials at the lower tail of the distribution, where labor supply probably far exceeds 
demand.24 Similarly, the poorest independent workers suffer more from their vulnerability and do 
not adopt strategies to compensate for it by increasing their profits (raising receipts or reducing 
                                                 
23 Not to mention potential informational asymmetries, the assumption of perfect information being, in the theory of 
compensating differentials, a necessary condition for pecuniary compensations to apply. 
24 For example, Fernández and Nordman (2009) interpret the absence of compensating wage differentials for 
working conditions at the tail ends of the earnings distribution in the United Kingdom as evidence of a « missing 
middle » in the distribution of manpower skills in this country. In other words, where labor demand exceeds labor 
supply, employers would be more inclined to compensate for adverse working conditions. 
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expenditure). An independent worker at the upper tail of the earnings distribution could more 
easily make trade-offs between working conditions and earnings. 
However, the different aspects of vulnerability have diverse impacts on income. For 
example, working a second vulnerable job has a negative effect on the average earnings of 
independent workers in the informal sector, but no impact in the formal private sector. So 
working a second insecure job could be seen as a way of diversifying excessive risks associated 
with a vulnerable main job in the informal sector. Also, wages do not compensate for contractual 
insecurity among dependent workers or for itinerant, solitary work among independent workers 
in any of the cities or institutional sectors. The only pecuniary compensation mechanism for 
vulnerability is found with visible underemployment, which has a positive impact on the average 
earnings of dependent workers in both sectors and independent workers in the informal sector.  
In a nutshell, vulnerability compensating mechanism is mainly seen in the informal sector, 
in the upper tail of the earning distribution, and particularly in the circumstance of visible 
underemployment. The private formal sector does not offer the best protection against the 
common features of employment vulnerability. Vulnerability, which is the norm in West African 
cities, is not compensated for the largest part of the labor force, i.e. the full-time workers in the 
private sector. A slight compensating mechanism is at work in the informal sector, all things 
being equal, but even then, the marginal effect of the vulnerability on earnings appears well 
above the mean vulnerability index, the only clear exception being Dakar.  
Whereas our analysis does not generally confirm the applicability of the theory of 
compensating differentials on West African cities, especially where these compensating 
mechanisms should be most expected (i.e. in the formal sector), an institutional approach might 
be more relevant in the African urban context. In such peripheral cities in the world economy, 
workers’ unions are essentially active in the public sector, notably weak in the formal private 
sector, and virtually non-existent in the informal private sector. The same can be said of 
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employment laws and worker’s rights that are hardly enforced. As a result, the bargaining power 
of both independent and dependent workers is very weak. There remains to confirm if our 
results, based on the relatively homogenous WAEMU region, can be generalized to the 
continent. For instance, we may expect more compensating mechanisms in cities in South Africa 
or in Northern African countries. Being less peripheral than West African cities, workers unions 
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Appendices 
Table 1: Samples used 
 Niamey Ouagadougou Dakar Bamako Cotonou Lome Abidjan 
Sample total 14,524 13,733 19,054 13,002 11,574 9,906 11,343 
Working-age population (WAP) 8,284 8,525 12,487 7,529 7,639 6,418 7,503 
WAP with five or more years of potential experience  7,269 7,328 11,014 6,561 6,517 6,546 6,537 
Regression 
samples 
Zero income 4,053 3,663 6,074 2,746 2,374 2,081 2,568 
Public sector (positive income) 577 584 498 457 398 306 302 
Formal private sector (positive income): 409 336 950 452 509 302 825 
- Dependent 373 307 868 365 423 261 782 
- Independent 36 29 82 87 86 41 43 
Informal private sector (positive income): 2,230 2,745 3,492 2,906 3,236 2,857 2,842 
- Dependent 562 724 1,123 528 460 508 894 
- Independent 1,668 2,021 2,369 2,378 2,776 2,349 1,948 
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1 (2001-2002), National Institutes of Statistics, AFRISTAT, DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
Note: The informal private sector gathers all individuals working in firms which are not registered or in which no written accounts are kept. Dependent workers are employees 
(wage employees or not). Independent workers are self-employed workers and employers.
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Contractual insecurity:  
no contract OR no pay slip 
Independent    
Dependent 0.49 0.97 0.76 
All     
Independent with no employees 
(wage-earning or otherwise) 
Independent 0.11 0.68 0.66 
Dependent    
All     
Adverse working conditions: 
premises not dedicated to the job 
Independent 0.17 0.60 0.59 
Dependent 0.05 0.22 0.15 
All  0.06 0.50 0.42 
Casual labor:  
Piece-rate, day or seasonal work 
Independent 0.13 0.20 0.20 
Dependent 0.10 0.15 0.13 
All  0.10 0.19 0.17 
Unstable remuneration: paid in a form other than 
a fixed wage (monthly, fortnightly or weekly) or, for 
independent workers, in a form other than profits 
Independent 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Dependent 0.18 0.40 0.31 
All  0.17 0.14 0.15 
Visible underemployment:  
Works fewer hours than the statutory working week 
AND would like to work more   
Independent 0.09 0.13 0.13 
Dependent 0.07 0.07 0.07 
All  0.07 0.12 0.11 
Working a second vulnerable job: outside the 
public sector in a place or premises not dedicated to 
the job and in a firm of less than 5 people 
Independent 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Dependent 0.01 0.01 0.01 
All  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Employment instability:  
on a downwardly mobile or unstable career path 
Independent 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Dependent 0.08 0.08 0.08 
All  0.07 0.04 0.05 
unwanted job: involuntary departure from the 
previous job or job dissatisfaction 
Independent 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Dependent 0.09 0.06 0.07 
All  0.09 0.06 0.06 
vulnerable: meets at least one of the vulnerability 
criteria 
Independent 0.42 0.87 0.86 
Dependent 0.62 0.98 0.82 
All  0.60 0.90 0.85 
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, authors’ calculations on the weighted data. 
Reading: The mean of the contractual insecurity variable for the subsample of formal private sector dependent 
workers who report strictly positive earnings is 0.49. This means that 49% of the dependent workers in the formal 
private sector do not have a written contract or do not receive a pay slip.
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Table 3: Marginal effects of vulnerability intensity on earnings 
  Niamey Ouagadougou Dakar Bamako Cotonou Lome Abidjan 
Marginal effect at the average vulnerability point in the formal private sector 
No selection correction, exogenous vulnerability -14.3%*** -9.3%* -16.2%** -13.9%*** -10.9% -7.4% -12.6% (4.9) (5.2) (7.7) (4.1) (8.6) (6.1) (8.7) 
Selection correction, exogenous vulnerability -14.2%*** -9.3% -16.2%*** -13.8% -10.9%* -7.0% -12.5%*** (4.9) (7.7) (4.2) (8.6) (6.2) (10.0) (4.6) 
Selection correction, endogenous vulnerability -23.0%*** -22.5% -33.5%*** -37.3%*** -15.5% -24.8%*** -24.2%* (6.2) (15.2) (1.4) (10.4) (17.9) (4.5) (13.2) 
Observations 409 336 950 452 509 302 825 
Average  intensity 1.325 1.077 1.024 0.858 0.967 1.199 1.035 
Marginal effect at the average vulnerability point in the informal sector 
No selection correction, exogenous vulnerability -1.0% -1.7% 0.2% -1.3% -0.6% -0.1% -2.8% (5.2) (3.5) (4.3) (4.1) (5.2) (3.8) (3.4) 
Selection correction, exogenous vulnerability -1.0% -1.6% 0.2% -1.3% -0.7% -0.3% -2.9% (3.6) (4.2) (4.4) (5.6) (3.6) (3.4) (3.9) 
Selection correction, endogenous vulnerability -9.7%*** -15.6%*** 1.0% -17.2%*** -3.4% -13.1%*** -19.9%*** (1.9) (1.2) (20.5) (1.5) (18.4) (3.3) (0.7) 
Observations 2,230 2,745 3,492 2,906 3,236 2,857 2,842 
Average intensity 2.229 1.787 1.959 1.801 1.757 1.960 1.661 






Standard errors of the marginal effects are in parenthesis and were calculated using the delta-method.
 
Significance of the coefficients: * at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 
1% level.Reading: In the informal sector of Niamey, according the model with selection correction and endogeneous vulnerability, one additional point of vulnerability reduces 
income by 9.7%, which is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Effect of vulnerability on earnings in the formal private sector 
 Formal private sector 
Niamey Ouagadougou Dakar Bamako Cotonou Lome Abidjan
OLS 
I -0.418*** -0.418*** -0.247*** -0.304*** -0.223** -0.285*** -0.304***(0.090) (0.095) (0.096) (0.058) (0.104) (0.076) (0.116)
I2 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.062** 0.046*** 0.034 0.079*** 0.088***(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.033) (0.023) (0.032)
Adjusted R2  0.52 0.52 0.53 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.41
Obs. 409 336 950 452 509 302 825
Lee model 
I -0.414*** -0.252*** -0.304*** -0.219** -0.286*** -0.297** -0.220***(0.092) (0.096) (0.062) (0.103) (0.079) (0.129) (0.058)
I2 0.075*** 0.064** 0.046*** 0.033 0.079*** 0.087** 0.033**(0.025) (0.028) (0.017) (0.034) (0.025) (0.037) (0.016)
hλ  -0.460** 0.225 0.053 0.456 0.121 -0.550 0.157(0.199) (0.238) (0.157) (0.313) (0.164) (0.418) (0.133)
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.48 
Lee model with correction for the endogeneity of vulnerability using the control function method 
I -1.227** -0.495 -0.886*** -0.741 -0.355 -0.747** -0.434(0.561) (0.435) (0.186) (0.487) (0.316) (0.349) (0.338)
I2 0.077*** 0.065** 0.046*** 0.030 0.079*** 0.089** 0.033**(0.023) (0.028) (0.016) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035) (0.017)
µˆ  0.809 0.243 0.589*** 0.533 0.071 0.454 0.216(0.552) (0.411) (0.174) (0.486) (0.319) (0.324) (0.329)
hλ  -0.505*** 0.152 0.045 0.410 0.127 -0.518 0.130 (0.191) (0.272) (0.164) (0.305) (0.179) (0.409) (0.139)
Adjusted R2   0.51 0.51 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.48 
 
Notes: The standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications). Significance of the coefficients: *: at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. 
The control variables are a dummy variable for gender, an education variable (number of years of successfully completed education), potential experience and 
seniority in the firm, religion (Christian, reference: Muslim), migratory status (rural, urban or foreign migrant, reference: native of the city studied), marital status 
(conjugal status, reference: widowed, divorced or single), and independent status (self-employed employer or own-account worker versus dependent worker).  
The selection identifying variables are the inverse of the dependency ratio (number of employed workers to household size), a dummy variable for whether the 
individual’s father went to primary school and a dummy variable for whether the individual’s head of household is a woman. 
The control function instruments are the status of the head of household and the institutional sector in which the interviewee’s father worked.  
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Table 5: Effect of vulnerability on earnings in the informal private sector 
 Informal sector 
Niamey Ouagadougou Dakar Bamako Cotonou Lome Abidjan
OLS 
I -0.221*** -0.309*** -0.251*** -0.128*** -0.164*** -0.240*** -0.253***(0.059) (0.056) (0.048) (0.040) (0.052) (0.041) (0.043)
I2 0.033** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.066*** 0.064***(0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Adjusted R2  0.49 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.24
Obs. 2,230 2,745 3,492 2,906 3,236 2,857 2,842
Lee model
I -0.310*** -0.252*** -0.128*** -0.163*** -0.242*** -0.256*** -0.157***(0.053) (0.050) (0.042) (0.055) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
I2 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.037***(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
hλ  0.055 -0.051 -0.019 -0.046 0.071 0.155** 0.182***(0.065) (0.069) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.072) (0.064)
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.26 
Lee model with correction for the endogeneity of vulnerability using the control function method
I -0.515*** -0.605*** -0.119 -0.561*** -0.278 -1.045*** -0.648***(0.184) (0.135) (0.252) (0.206) (0.339) (0.251) (0.184)
I2 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.036***(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
µˆ  0.206 0.358*** -0.009 0.401** 0.036 0.793*** 0.500***(0.180) (0.127) (0.250) (0.200) (0.337) (0.247) (0.183)
hλ  0.047 -0.063 -0.019 -0.053 0.070 0.088 0.157** (0.065) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060) (0.056) (0.076) (0.064)
Adjusted R2   0.22 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.26 
 
Notes: The standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications). Significance of the coefficients: *: at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. 
The control variables are a dummy variable for gender, the number of years of successfully completed education), potential experience and seniority in the firm, 
religion, migratory status, marital status, and independent status. The selection identifying variables are the inverse of the dependency ratio, a dummy variable for 
whether the individual’s father went to primary school and a dummy variable for whether the individual’s head of household is a woman. The control function 
instruments are the status of the head of household and the institutional sector in which the interviewee’s father worked.  
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Table 6: Correlations between the principal component analysis axes and the vulnerability criteria 
 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 
Dependent workers 
Correlations between  the variables and the axes 
Contractual insecurity  70.67*** 09.58*** 06.84*** 05.74*** 
Adverse working conditions  68.17*** -00.94 00.29 00.52 
Casual labor 53.24*** 03.54*** 60.34*** 03.28*** 
Unstable remuneration 76.43*** -01.17 27.12*** -00.35 
Visible underemployment  12.27*** 03.76*** 89.04*** -02.10** 
Working a second vulnerable job  02.86*** 01.02 -01.27 99.69*** 
Employment instability  00.20 76.96*** -02.79*** -04.11*** 
Unwanted job 05.63*** 75.00*** 10.33*** 06.00*** 
Explained variance (%) 22.19 14.53 14.33 12.52 
Independent workers 
Correlations between  the variables and the axes 
Independent, no employees 00.39 -05.39*** 75.61*** -06.47*** 
Adverse working conditions 01.33* 26.99*** 70.27*** 13.77*** 
Casual labor 03.03*** 74.95*** 13.84*** 01.59** 
Unstable remuneration  -05.13*** 57.96*** -28.91*** 04.24*** 
Visible underemployment  12.30*** 58.23*** 28.13*** -20.60*** 
Working a second vulnerable job 01.29 -02.38*** 00.74 97.24*** 
Employment instability 82.75*** -00.92 01.08 01.86** 
Unwanted job 82.55*** 07.50*** 02.52*** 00.58 
Explained variance (%) 17.27 16.29 15.43 12.66 
Reading: For dependent workers, correlation between contractual insecurity and the first axis is equal to 70.67 and is significant at the 1% level. Also axis 1 is largely determined by this 




Table 7: Effects of the vulnerability axes on earnings in the formal private sector (Lee model) 
 
Formal private sector 
Niamey Ouagadougou Dakar Bamako Cotonou Lome Abidjan 
Axis 1 - Dependent workers:  
Contractual insecurity, casual employment and adverse 
working conditions 
-0.205*** -0.129*** -0.181*** -0.130*** -0.137*** -0.186*** -0.179*** 
(0.034) (0.043) (0.023) (0.045) (0.037) (0.062) (0.030)
Axis 2 - Dependent workers:  
Subsistence job 
-0.067** 0.006 -0.023 -0.070** -0.006 -0.018 -0.047*** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.035) (0.017)
Axis 3 - Dependent workers:  
Underemployment 
0.121*** 0.137*** 0.031 0.079** 0.183*** 0.260*** 0.127*** 
(0.041) (0.037) (0.021) (0.037) (0.044) (0.064) (0.030)
Axis 4 - Dependent workers:  
Working a second highly vulnerable job 
-0.023 -0.070 0.003 -0.053 -0.033 0.051 -0.096 
(0.224) (0.210) (0.026) (0.043) (0.023) (0.037) (0.374)
Axis 1 - Independent workers:  
Subsistence job 
0.289 -0.273 -0.164 0.074 0.063 -0.142 -0.340 
(0.958) (24.789) (0.125) (2.058) (0.193) (0.278) (2.750)
Axis 2 - Independent workers:  
Underemployment  
0.048 0.266 -0.031 -0.317 0.353* 0.170 -0.006 
(0.196) (0.199) (0.087) (0.288) (0.182) (1.229) (0.271)
Axis 3 - Independent workers:  
No employees and adverse working conditions 
-0.235 0.033 -0.103 -0.077 -0.279** 0.068 -0.276 
(0.216) (0.570) (0.121) (0.180) (0.119) (1.387) (0.182)
Axis 4 - Independent workers:  
Working a second highly vulnerable job 
-0.026 -2.585 -0.138 -0.577 0.147 -1.275 -2.306** 
(0.753) (2.208) (0.491) (1.007) (0.583) (2.316) (0.935)
Selection correction -0.400** 0.196 0.048 0.475 0.046 -0.629 0.078 (0.185) (0.216) (0.164) (0.306) (0.163) (0.399) (0.127)
Observations 409 336 950 452 509 302 825 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.55 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.51 
Notes: The standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications). Significance of the coefficients: * at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. 
Axis i – Dependent workers, i=1 to 4, is equal to 0 for independent workers. Axis i – Independent workers, i=1 to 4, is equal to 0 for dependent workers. 
The control variables are a dummy variable for gender, an education variable (number of years of successfully completed education), potential experience and seniority in 
the firm, religion, migratory status, marital status, and independent status (self-employed employer or own-account worker versus dependent worker).  
The selection identifying variables are the inverse of the dependency ratio (number of employed workers to household size), a dummy variable for whether the 
individual’s father went to primary school and a dummy variable for whether the individual’s head of household is a woman. 
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Table 8: Effects of the vulnerability axes on earnings in the informal private sector (Lee model) 
 
Informal private sector 
Niamey Ouagadougou Dakar Bamako Cotonou Lome Abidjan 
Axis 1 - Dependent workers:  
Contractual insecurity, casual employment and adverse 
working conditions 
-0.080*** -0.107*** -0.059*** -0.040 -0.064** -0.088*** -0.104*** 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.023) 
Axis 2 - Dependent workers:  
Subsistence job 
-0.019 0.018 -0.014 0.006 -0.006 -0.025 -0.019 
(0.028) (0.035) (0.022) (0.048) (0.035) (0.024) (0.020) 
Axis 3 - Dependent workers:  
Underemployment 
0.164*** 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.078** 0.168*** 0.165*** 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.025) (0.024) 
Axis 4 - Dependent workers:  
Working a second highly vulnerable job 
0.011 -0.027 -0.076 -0.028 -0.051*** -0.016 -0.010 
(0.028) (0.022) (0.083) (0.022) (0.015) (0.033) (0.022) 
Axis 1 - Independent workers:  
Subsistence job 
-0.021 0.034* -0.009 -0.045** 0.005 -0.003 -0.011 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
Axis 2 - Independent workers:  
Underemployment  
0.062*** 0.177*** 0.084*** 0.137*** 0.177*** 0.165*** 0.195*** 
(0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030) 
Axis 3 - Independent workers:  
No employees and adverse working conditions 
-0.055*** -0.108*** -0.026 -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.089*** -0.098*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) 
Axis 4 - Independent workers:  
Working a second highly vulnerable job 
-0.050* -0.018 -0.082*** -0.052*** -0.040*** -0.050*** -0.112*** 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.034) 
Selection correction 0.051 -0.021 0.004 -0.027 0.077 0.153** 0.181*** (0.060) (0.060) (0.056) (0.057) (0.052) (0.077) (0.064) 
Observations 2,230 2,745 3,492 2,906 3,236 2,857 2,842 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.35 -0.26 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.28 
Notes: The standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications). Significance of the coefficients: *: at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. 
Axis i – Dependent workers, i=1 to 4, is equal to 0 for independent workers. Axis i – Independent workers, i=1 to 4, is equal to 0 for dependent workers. 
The control variables are a dummy variable for gender, an education variable (number of years of successfully completed education), potential experience and seniority in 
the firm, religion, migratory status, marital status, and independent status (self-employed employer or own-account worker versus dependent worker).  
The selection identifying variables are the inverse of the dependency ratio (number of employed workers to household size), a dummy variable for whether the individual’s 
father went to primary school and a dummy variable for whether the individual’s head of household is a woman drawn between 1 and 2.
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Chart 1a: Average income by vulnerability intensity 
(Formal private sector) 
 
Chart 1b: Average income by vulnerability intensity  
(Informal sector) 
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Chart 2a: Average predicted income (Lee model with endogenous vulnerability) 
by vulnerability intensity (formal private sector) 
 
Chart 2b:  Average predicted income (Lee model with endogenous vulnerability) 
by vulnerability intensity (informal private sector) 
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Chart 3a: Marginal effect of vulnerability on income by decile  
 (Formal private sector) 
 
Chart 3b: Marginal effect of vulnerability on income by decile  
(Informal private sector) 
 
